F-16 sale to Türkiye: can US 'goodwill' message break the impasse?

The Biden administration has taken a symbolic yet significant step regarding the F-16 issue. Türkiye officially submitted a request to purchase a total of 40 F-16s and 79 F-16 upgrade kits worth $20 billion in October 2021. The Biden administration had previously announced its support for the sale. On Monday, news reports indicated that the administration had officially notified Congress of the $259 million software update portion of the sale. The fact that this step was taken immediately after Türkiye approved Finland's NATO membership shows that the administration has convinced Congress members to at least send a positive signal to Türkiye. If there is no obstruction from Congress in the next 15 days and the sale is completed, it will send a goodwill message regarding the entire F-16 sale.

Türkiye had focused its efforts on air defense procurement in response to increasing threats from Syria. It particularly sought to purchase Patriot systems from the U.S. to protect its southern border, but the terms regarding technology sharing, price, and delivery time were not met. Western allies' hasty withdrawal of the Patriots they temporarily deployed to protect Türkiye's southern border intensified Ankara's efforts to procure an air defense system. The image of the West not taking Türkiye's security concerns seriously was one of the factors that led Ankara to purchase the S-400 system. This process, which caused the most serious crisis between Türkiye and the U.S. since the Cyprus operation, ultimately resulted in Ankara's removal from the F-35 program, and the Turkish-American defense relations experienced one of their most challenging periods in history.

The United States' failure to take Ankara's concerns about regional threats seriously, and its lack of attention to the seriousness of Türkiye's search for alternative solutions in air defense procurement, including the proposal to establish a joint working group to resolve the S-400 issue, has resulted in Ankara being disregarded. While Türkiye argued that its removal from the F-35 program was a political move that was incompatible with NATO's alliance, the US Congress sought to actively shape its foreign policy against Russia for domestic political reasons. Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in an attempt to narrow Trump's foreign policy scope and chose to punish Ankara's S-400 procurement with this law. The fact that this law was not applied to countries like India served as evidence of double standards.

Türkiye played a critical role in the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia's occupation of Ukraine. These policies thwarted some circles in Washington's efforts to define Türkiye as an actor who was moving away from the West by partnering with Russia. Instead of trying to resolve ambiguous issues such as YPG and S-400 with Ankara, the Biden administration preferred to freeze them and seek common ground on issues such as Afghanistan, Libya, and Ukraine. While this delaying tactic prevented relations from deteriorating, it did not resolve the problems at hand. In this context, Türkiye's request to purchase F-16s stood out as an opportunity to create a positive agenda in bilateral relations.

Despite making significant progress in the defense industry and significantly reducing its dependence on foreign sources, Türkiye did not want its military capacity to be compromised in the short and medium term. Therefore, the F-16 request provided an opportunity for Washington to take a step toward normalizing defense relations. While it was not possible for the American administration to use S-400 as an excuse against F-16s as they did in the F-35 issue, the classic problem of Congress would arise in any case. Although the Biden administration announced its "strong support" for the F-16 sale, it was clear that it was not ready to exert serious pressure on Congress. On the other hand, messages from Türkiye that it would seek alternative solutions if necessary must be taken seriously this time, as a new crisis could weaken both bilateral defense relations and NATO's southern flank.

Following informal notifications from the Biden administration to members of Congress, the negotiations did not appear to go very well for Türkiye as some senators were attempting to put forth conditions that Ankara would not accept. One of the conditions expressed by a few senators was the acceptance of Finland and Sweden's NATO membership. Some senators also brought up political guarantees in favor of Greece. Ankara's approval of Finland's membership and showing that Sweden's membership could be possible within the framework of the Triple Agreement could eliminate the most popular excuse for NATO expansion in Congress.

At this point, the Biden administration is putting a small portion of the package into the official notification process, saying that Türkiye has taken a positive step towards NATO expansion with a "good faith" message that should be responded to by "worried senators". However, delaying the official notification process for the F-16 package, other than a software update, until after the election shows how much the process has actually been slowed down for political reasons. If Sweden takes the necessary steps to combat terrorism and quickly address Türkiye's concerns by joining the NATO alliance, most senators will have no concrete reason to give the Biden administration a hard time. If Congress continues to insist, the Biden administration has the power to push the sales process through, but we will have to wait and see if the administration is willing to pay a political price for Tükiye in such a scenario.