In April, diplomatic channels were abuzz. Relations between Ankara and Washington were easing. Examples of this thaw included talks on Sweden’s NATO membership and F-16 negotiations. Diplomats and intelligence officers from both countries had even begun discussing the future of terrorist organizations in Syria. This progress was set to culminate in a meeting between the two leaders, with plans for a White House visit in May where President Erdoğan would meet with Biden in the U.S. However, Ankara
In April, diplomatic channels were abuzz. Relations between Ankara and Washington were easing. Examples of this thaw included talks on Sweden’s NATO membership and F-16 negotiations. Diplomats and intelligence officers from both countries had even begun discussing the future of terrorist organizations in Syria. This progress was set to culminate in a meeting between the two leaders, with plans for a White House visit in May where President Erdoğan would meet with Biden in the U.S.
However, Ankara informed Biden’s team that the visit wouldn’t take place due to scheduling conflicts. In response, the Biden administration asked Ankara to propose a new date. Given that U.S. presidents focus on campaigning in the three months leading up to elections, and with the busy NATO summit in July, the American side wanted the meeting to happen before July. Still, Ankara didn’t provide a new timeline. The assessment in Türkiye was that Trump would likely win the election.
FIDAN'S DISCREET MEETING IN IRAQ
This assessment was not just an expectation but also a preference. Despite the ups and downs in their relationship, Erdoğan and Trump had a certain familiarity, even sharing each other’s personal phone numbers. Additionally, Trump viewed relations with Ankara differently than Biden. Democrats had a long list of issues, while Trump saw matters like the PKK and S-400 as burdens. In short, Biden’s policy on Gaza and the expectation of a Democratic loss led Ankara to adopt a “let’s wait for November 5” stance.
Ankara kept relations with Biden’s team warm but placed its main bets on Trump. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s discreet meeting with Richard Grenell, who is rumored to be Trump’s pick for Secretary of State, during the NATO summit in Washington in July reinforced this view. Türkiye’s prediction was accurate, as Trump won. President Erdoğan congratulated "my friend Trump," and the two spoke by phone. The question now is: what’s next?
CENTCOM COULD PRESSURE TRUMP
During Trump’s term, Türkiye can expect four major developments, some favorable and others challenging.
First, the U.S. relationship with the PKK was already under discussion. I noted earlier that if Harris won, withdrawal might be gradual, but with Trump, it would accelerate (see "The Scenario Facing the PKK in Syria," October 2024). Trump's team explicitly mentioned reconsidering U.S. support for YPG/PKK terrorists in their pre-election foreign policy outline. However, CENTCOM might pressure the President to sustain the terrorist presence in Syria—perhaps under a new name or guise—through local "elections" to give it a political identity. We’ll see how this unfolds.
Second, Trump’s plan for Ukraine is roughly as follows: Zelensky would be pressured to negotiate with Russia, with future U.S. aid dependent on Ukraine’s participation in peace talks. The negotiations would use current battle lines as a basis, potentially setting the stage for peace talks in Ukraine. This could also reduce the sanctions pressure Türkiye faces due to its relationship with Russia. Foreign Minister Fidan had previously said, “Our goal is to exit CAATSA, and we’re working on creative solutions.” This is a positive shift, though Washington’s possible normalization with Moscow could leave us dealing with a more assertive Russia in Syria.
**TÜRKIYE’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN THE EU**
Third, the EU has been preparing for a Trump presidency for a year, seeking “strategic autonomy.” Plans include strengthening its defense industry, establishing a new nuclear umbrella, and creating a unified command structure. In this challenging turn, Brussels wants Türkiye by its side. Türkiye's influence is rising, as seen in projects like the European Sky Shield and Eurofighter, lifted sanctions, and improving relations with Greece over the past year.
Fourth, Trump was the architect of the “Circle Alliance,” which aimed to reconcile the Gulf with Israel to secure Tel Aviv and contain Iran. Biden continued this policy with a slightly different approach. Israel has used the events of October 7 to pursue a strategy of annexing Gaza, creating buffer zones in Lebanon and Syria, pushing Iran out of Syria, and dismantling Tehran's nuclear capacity. Trump’s 2020 order to kill Qassem Soleimani marked the start of efforts to expel Iran from Syria. Although Trump says he’ll “end the war,” the nature of any peace is uncertain. It's likely Trump will resume support for Israel from where he left off. Netanyahu’s last-minute replacement of Defense Minister Gallant—a moderate close to the Biden administration—with the hardline Foreign Minister Katz just before the U.S. election is ominous (I believe that one day the U.S. will avenge itself on the embarrassment Netanyahu has caused, and perhaps Trump will be the one to do it, but that’s a story for another time).
There’s much more to discuss regarding the Trump era, but let’s conclude with this thought: Erdoğan and Trump will likely want to meet in person before making any major decisions. The postponed meeting with Biden may soon be rescheduled with Trump, as there are many pressing topics to cover.
