Viewing Middle East Events Through the Lens of Global Relations

While the world focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, the October 7th events and the subsequent developments took everyone by surprise. It's now clear that this wasn't a random occurrence. Israel's fascist, extremist government seized the opportunity and initiated a literal genocide in Gaza. They didn't stop there; they expanded the operation into Lebanon and Syria. This expansion was primarily aimed at a final confrontation with Iran. However, there were two broader global dimensions to this. Beyond Iran, the aim was to cut off Russia and China's influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and ultimately, Africa.

Russia, engaged in war with Ukraine, had solidified its relationships with India and China, while entering a strategic and military alignment with Iran and North Korea. Ultimately, China became involved with Iran on a long-term program, attempting to pave the way for peace between Iran and the Gulf states. The events of October 7th and beyond were set to disrupt all these processes. Russia struggled in the face of rising anti-Iran sentiment in the Middle East, having significantly reduced its military presence in the region due to the Ukraine war. It understood it couldn't hold its position in the Middle East without Iran but was also aware of the contradiction of being aligned with Iran. Israel's attacks went unchecked. Russia tried to create a diplomatic avenue between Assad's regime and Türkiye through the Astana process, but this move was too late and, in some ways, born out of desperation. It was clear to everyone that an Erdoğan-Assad meeting was futile. Türkiye understood this, and Iran would never have accepted it. Nonetheless, Türkiye took the lead, at least nominally, ensuring it wasn’t the rejecting party, which turned out to be the right move. We can see that Russia had no further say in the matter.

It was clear that Assad's position was becoming precarious. The issue of Syria's re-entry into the Arab League, with the Gulf Arabs and Egypt offering Assad a lifeline, didn't benefit Assad much.

Iran was also caught off guard. It failed to see that a reckoning was inevitable. Hezbollah didn't support Hamas immediately after October 7th. Had it done so, we don't know if the situation would have been different. Israel first dealt Hezbollah a heavy defeat, pushing them back north of the Litani River. Then it heavily bombarded Syria, crushing Iranian elements there. The situation in Syria was beginning to change.

It seems Türkiye has been closely monitoring developments. It supported efforts to establish structures in Idlib, bolstered its presence in Iraq, and significantly weakened the PKK in the Qandil region with Operation Claw-Lock. These operations can't be seen as separate from what was happening in Syria.

The process leading to Assad's downfall, and the simultaneous elimination of Russia and Iran from the game, doesn’t need further explanation. From the outset, I wrote that this was part of an Anglo-American plan based on its components. At the regional level, this involved two conflicting elements: Israel and Türkiye. What happens next in the Middle East will undoubtedly be a power struggle between these two parties. The ancient Euphrates River remains decisive here. To the west of the Euphrates, there is a Türkiye, strong with its control over the PKK, SMO, and HTS, and its influence continues to grow. Israel, tired from a year of war, is extremely disturbed by Türkiye's control over the western Euphrates and its growing presence in Damascus. We see similar concerns in the Gulf Arab states and Egypt, with the exception of Qatar. Israel is also focused on creating a secure zone around the Golan Heights while increasing support for PYD terrorists in the east. HTS, which has expressed it doesn't want war with Israel, is not comfortable either. Israel will do everything it can to weaken the coordination between HTS and SMO, as well as to undermine the relationship between Türkiye and HTS. Israel won’t stop there; it will target Türkiye’s stronghold in Erbil. Its next move may involve stirring up Iran, setting the stage for a Turkish-Persian conflict.

In response, Türkiye is working hard to maintain the distance between HTS and the PYD. At the same time, it is taking radical steps to eliminate PYD’s presence in the east of the Euphrates. It must be understood that for Türkiye, the issue goes beyond creating a 30 km security zone. Turkish intelligence, sometimes with HTS’s support, is working to remove the PYD and other Kurdish and Arab elements in the region to cut off PYD's foothold. If necessary, the Turkish military may intervene.

The core issue revolves around how Anglo-Saxon energy companies will route energy resources from the Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The most rational choice is clearly Türkiye. However, Israel’s opposition, fueled by its desire for control, complicates things. Israel’s biggest hope is that Trump, supported by major defense and technology companies, will return to power. Trump carries two conflicting elements in his decision-making: a pragmatic economic mindset that favors Türkiye and an Evangelical ideological approach that supports Israel. We’ll see which mindset prevails and how much the British establishment can control Trump. It may be early to judge, but one question remains: If Türkiye wins this power struggle, what will be asked of us in return? Are we on the brink of a new Crimean War? God forbid...