Our neighbor Iran held the first round of presidential elections. It must be noted from the outset that the outcome is quite thought-provoking. None of the candidates managed to surpass the 50% threshold. Consequently, the two candidates who received the most votes advanced to the second round. What stood out was that the candidate with the highest number of votes was Masoud Pezeshkian. Known for his critical distance from the regime's practices, Pezeshkian is characterized as a reformist figure.
Our neighbor Iran held the first round of presidential elections. It must be noted from the outset that the outcome is quite thought-provoking. None of the candidates managed to surpass the 50% threshold. Consequently, the two candidates who received the most votes advanced to the second round. What stood out was that the candidate with the highest number of votes was Masoud Pezeshkian. Known for his critical distance from the regime's practices, Pezeshkian is characterized as a reformist figure. He stands alone in representing this wing among the candidates and is recognized as a former Minister of Health. Moreover, Pezeshkian proudly identifies with his Azerbaijani Turkic roots and consistently asserts that he speaks Turkish, not Persian, at home.
Pezeşkiyan received approximately 1 million more votes than the other conservative candidate, Saeed Jalili. Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, who came third in the first round and is known for his conservatism like Jalili, was sidelined after urging his supporters to back Jalili in the second round. By a simple calculation, the overwhelming majority of the 3.5 million votes Ghalibaf received in the second round will go to Jalili, likely securing Jalili's victory. However, it's not all that simple. Other possibilities exist, particularly concerning voter turnout. Officially, voter turnout in Iran remained around 40%. Perhaps more than 60% of Iran's population chose to boycott the election. Among them, perhaps 10% are a marginalized group living only in remote rural areas. It is clear that the remaining 50% consciously chose not to vote and harbor sentiments against the regime. However, they do not necessarily embrace Pezeshkian's reformist stance. Nevertheless, viewing his first-round success as an opportunity, they might pragmatically choose to support Pezeshkian in the second round, thereby making his election not entirely improbable.
If Pezeshkian were elected, could we anticipate significant change in Iran? Firstly, we must ask: How did the Iranian clerics, who vetoed a regime loyalist like Ahmadinejad, give the green light to reformist Pezeshkian? They may have sought to demonstrate to the global community the compatibility of Iran's elections with pluralistic democratic values. Another motive could have been to increase voter turnout. They might have believed that the legitimacy of the election would be weakened if all candidates were conservative. Perhaps, for this reason, they wanted to include a token reformist candidate in the race. If true, it would cast doubt on Pezeshkian's reformist credentials. This suggests that Pezeshkian's reformism may be guided by tactical considerations rather than genuine intent. Even if Pezeshkian's reformism is sincere, the extent to which he can influence Iran's governance remains debatable, especially in the face of the will of the Ayatollahs, particularly Ali Khamenei. This might also reflect the sentiments of the 60% who did not vote.
Lastly, it suggests that the theocratic state in Iran may have decided to soften its stance. Perhaps there is a state decision in Iran to continue with a regime-loyal, controllable, low-intensity reformist like Pezeshkian to repair the regime's legitimacy and alleviate increasing pressures from the world. Time will tell.
One thing is certain for Iran: the regime is grappling with a serious legitimacy crisis. In fact, this is a tragic barrier struck by claims of radical change from the outset of revolutions. Modernist revolutions, whether the French Revolution or the Soviet and Chinese Revolutions, initiated an intense cultural war against traditional-religious institutions and the mindset they fostered. The experience of Pol Pot epitomizes the most extreme dimensions of this. These revolutions aimed to create something new: the French Revolution aimed for Homo Luminous (Enlightened Man), while the Soviet Revolution pursued Homo Sovieticus. These endeavors involved both destruction and construction. The former, the process of destruction involving the wholesale elimination of existing institutions and cadres, was completed. However, none of them achieved what they desired in the latter, through intense indoctrination via education. Here, what matters vitally is whether the process is accompanied by industrialization. The result is the secularization of traditional-religious ties and, even though it is with a deep sense of alienation, it was also a process of worldliness. Yes, Homo Luminous and Homo Sovieticus, which essentially carried lofty moral claims, were not realized. But in their place, societies of weak, opportunistic, and egoistic individuals emerged. These societies provided cultural anchorage to the consumption of capitalism. Hard secularization in production and festive secularization in consumption followed.
Iran was a non-industrial society. In contrast to modernist revolutions, the Iranian revolution took place by bringing into play religious and traditional cultural codes. Iranian revolutionaries hold an approach that deems the disconnectedness of modernist revolutions from tradition and religion as the main reason for their failure. They argued that the main pillars that would ensure the success of the revolution and its long-term sustainability were religion and tradition. They, too, demolished the “gains” of Iranian modernization. Area cleaning was ensured. Come and see in the second stage, the cultural investment to achieve a Shi’a fundamentalist has been found that has been eroded over time, falling into the void, and corrupted. The vast majority of Iranian society continues to maintain its deep secularism through patterns that are much more seductive, such as consumption. The issue is, what the revolution took into account is not the historical-religious encounters. There were no failures of propaganda and indoctrination efforts, and the efforts of the Golden Generations to raise the question. In order to understand the deep-rooted historical and cultural contexts of these values, it's essential to distinguish between their preservation and their ceremonial propaganda. Surprisingly, sanctifying what is sanctified is gradually being worn away. Therefore, the preservation of values requires much more subtle political investments outside of the political sphere. I often find myself wondering what Ali Shariati would write if he were still alive...
