In the history of states, revolts and uprisings hold a significant place. This can be well explained by the center-periphery theory. States are organized, centralized institutions, and in their world, everything is considered peripheral. In the Ottoman Empire, the concept of the periphery carried both geopolitical and cultural meanings, representing a form of state exclusion both geographically and politically. The central-peripheral dialectic primarily involves the state taking surplus from the
In the history of states, revolts and uprisings hold a significant place. This can be well explained by the center-periphery theory. States are organized, centralized institutions, and in their world, everything is considered peripheral. In the Ottoman Empire, the concept of the periphery carried both geopolitical and cultural meanings, representing a form of state exclusion both geographically and politically. The central-peripheral dialectic primarily involves the state taking surplus from the periphery. This is done through taxation. Periphery elites or subjects, burdened by taxes, may orchestrate revolts against the center, which are seen as disruptive. These actions are inherently irregular, both in terms of their definition as crimes and their methods.
States maintain armies, and the function of these armies is to either expand their territory or maintain their existing one through warfare. These wars have common characteristics, rules, and methods. One key aspect is the direct confrontation of armies. Two armies, similarly organized and deployed, face each other on the battlefield and engage. The victor gains what they seek, while the loser is defeated. The logic of these wars is predictable and has identifiable aspects.
Another function of state armies is to suppress internal uprisings. This can turn things upside down. If an uprising organizes itself like an army, there is no issue. However, insurgents often lack the power and organization of a regular army and are therefore likely to be crushed by it. To bridge this power gap, they change their methods. Instead of directly confronting the armies, they hide within familiar natural surroundings, setting ambushes and attacking from behind. These situations are particularly frustrating. There is no comparable, clearly organized enemy facing the regular armies. We know that majestic armies have suffered significant losses or even defeats against insurgents who are far weaker in terms of power comparison.
From this perspective, it can be claimed that the states operate on a principle of direct confrontation, while insurgents use ambushes and attacks from behind. However, unusual short-circuits and transitions can also occur in these scenarios. Despite their emphasis on order, states do everything they can to weaken rival states and disrupt their order. They contact and incite insurgent elements against rival states and use them. Therefore, the record of states is quite troubled. This process is contagious. When all states engage in this practice, a normalization inevitably occurs. Essentially moral issues become normalized within the realm of realpolitik.
The above observation is primarily valid for rural-based uprisings at the borders where states lose control. Slave or tradesmen uprisings, although bloody, are easier to suppress. The success of urban uprisings often depends on whether they can find support from certain state elites involved in the struggle at the state level, or even whether they are manipulated or incited by them. There is also a short-circuit in this process. We know that these short-circuits are normalized with statements like “It will be for the best of the state, hopefully.”
Modern states are distinguished from ancient ones by significant equipment and capability differences. This has made the boundaries between regular and irregular spheres even more ambiguous. In suppressing internal social/class-based uprisings and in inter-state struggles, the irregular dark sides of states have begun to institutionalize. Espionage and agitation organizations, whether for defense or attack, have been integrated into and normalized within state structures. On the other hand, armies, while continuing classic warfare, have also developed special structures and units capable of conducting irregular warfare.
One can explain and understand all these within their own requirements. Yes, there are clear state rivalries and state interests. Even though they are irregular, there are laws and regulations that somewhat organize these dark and inevitable structures. Just as the CIA was established by U.S. law, the KGB existed in the Soviet Union. These agencies will combat irregular internal enemies they view as illegitimate within their domains and will provoke and use irregular elements they find abroad, branding them with legitimizing terms such as "National Hero," "Liberation Fighters," or "Freedom Army." However, most of this will be done covertly and will be denied if questioned. If open support is given, it will be claimed to be support for a legitimate local force.
During the Cold War, states did not directly clash but aimed to strengthen their positions by supporting local conflicts. After the Cold War, the balances were overturned. Alongside legitimizations based on conflicting localities, the Western victor of the Cold War began to target nation-states directly and comprehensively. Here, the concept of terrorism, whose content is unclear but is applied to any target, began to be used. Now, states and nations that are accused of terrorism and deemed threats to victorious Western values are also included. Regardless of the methods used, the struggle against them was considered permissible. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and others became the first victims of this wave. This was a significant change. The era of dancing between regular and irregular spheres and trying to hide the latter under the guise of the former had ended. Legitimation was replaced by permissiveness. What was not understood was that this change in the fight against terrorism would turn states themselves into entities that produce terrorism. And so it did. We are now experiencing an era of state terrorism in its true sense. Israel’s actions in Gaza exemplify this. The recent event, the massacre through detonating pagers, will be remembered as a clear example of this.
