East Mediterranean and the Caucasus

It is now widely understood that in this century, and in those to come, the world's new center of gravity will be Afro-Eurasia. The Mediterranean, especially its eastern part, is one of the key regions at the heart of this dynamic. Recently, significant natural resources have been discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, a development that has attracted attention not only from the neighboring countries but also from major global players. Western, Asian, and Eurasian energy companies, along with various other economic sectors, are now deeply involved. No political or military competition or conflict in the region can be fully understood without taking this dynamic into account.

It's clear that Türkiye's geopolitical stance cannot be separated from these developments. The relationships between Türkiye and Greece, Türkiye and Egypt, and Türkiye and Iran form the core of this heated process, the very "magma" of it, so to speak. Focusing solely on ideological or theological divisions will lead to incomplete and flawed conclusions, which could have serious consequences. We learned this firsthand during the Arab Spring, where emotionally-driven, maximalist approaches resulted in significant losses. It's crucial to confront these mistakes head-on to avoid repeating them. The current situation cannot accommodate maximalism. Instead, managing rivalries through flexible, cooperative strategies would be a wiser approach. From what I understand, those who pursue maximalist policies often find themselves isolated, facing the alliances they thought were the most uncompromising. Successful strategy requires separating chronic, irreconcilable differences from those that are manageable or can be postponed, and focusing on developing partnerships with the latter. Let’s make this concrete.

Contrary to some views, I argue that Greece is the only state with which Türkiye faces particularly tough challenges in reaching an agreement. Two developments over the past decade have further complicated this situation. Back in the 1970s, Greece's exit from NATO had provided significant relief for Türkiye. However, the incompetent leadership of the 1980 coup in Türkiye failed to capitalize on this, instead accepting the Rogers Plan and greenlighting Greece’s return to NATO. Greece didn't just rejoin NATO, it also became a member of the EU. These developments contributed to Türkiye’s effective exclusion from the West. Türkiye should have compensated for this by fostering closer ties with Russia, Iran, and the Arab world, especially Syria and Egypt. Although some progress was made with Russia, Türkiye fell into the trap of the Arab Spring. Moreover, influenced by U.S.-aligned factions within, Türkiye antagonized Iran. While relations with Iran, which had been strained in the 1990s, were somewhat repaired in the 2000s, the maximalist foreign policy shifts of the mid-2010s cost Türkiye two historical allies: Syria and Egypt. Worse yet, Russia and Iran ended up opposing Türkiye in Syria. Let’s now look at the current actors in Syria.

The U.S., Russia, and Iran, each pursuing their own Eastern Mediterranean agendas, have all established a foothold in this troubled region. The U.S. is developing a corridor using the PKK, disregarding Türkiye, to lay the groundwork for an Israel-India alliance. This corridor merges with another extending from Cyprus and Greece to the Baltics. Today, in the Eastern Mediterranean, a concentration of forces involving the U.S., India, Israel, Greece, and occasionally France is working to limit Türkiye’s influence. Türkiye's misguided policy toward Egypt has unfortunately pushed Egypt into this alignment as well.

Iran, on the other hand, isn't just focused on securing its regime's safety but is also using its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean as a stepping stone for its outreach into Africa. Iran's dominant geopolitical strategy aims to integrate the historical advantages of its position between Asia and Europe with its Eastern Mediterranean expansion. In this endeavor, Iran has allied with China, which rivals India, a partner of the West.

Three recent events have created opportunities to alleviate Türkiye's challenges. The first is the pressure from the West that led to the Russia-Ukraine war. Historically, U.S.-Russia rapprochement has always been detrimental to Türkiye, while the opposite has provided relief. Türkiye managed this successfully with a balanced foreign policy, creating opportunities by easing Russia's situation. The second event is Israel's maximalism following October 7. While I’m putting aside the atrocities in Gaza, it's clear that Israel's overreach has opened some doors for Türkiye to resolve its issues with Syria and Egypt. This maximalism has even caused concern in Russia and China. Türkiye is clearly aware of this opportunity. Its diplomatic overtures to China, its BRICS outreach, and the back-to-back meetings organized by China and Russia with Central Asian Turkic states align with this. Meanwhile, Russia's move to address the longstanding Türkiye-Syria tension and pressure Assad to reconcile with Türkiye is a welcome bonus. Israel's maximalism is also pressuring Egypt, which is being asked to open its borders and accept Palestinians. Strained Egypt is now seeking support, leading to renewed steps toward Türkiye-Egypt normalization.

The third event strengthening Türkiye's hand is Iran's curious alignment with the India-West alliance entrenched in Armenia after the Azerbaijan-Armenia war, which has placed it at odds with its allies, Russia and China. Iran’s relations with Russia are rapidly cooling. Iran is criticizing both Russia and Türkiye and has taken a firm, threatening stance against the Zangezur Corridor. The cooling of Iran-Russia and China-Iran relations presents new opportunities for Türkiye. Of course, the resolution of these issues is far from simple.

Those paying attention can see what’s happening. The rise of NATO and Israeli maximalism will, like all maximalist approaches, eventually hit a wall. Meanwhile, Türkiye, wrestling with these maximalist forces, is being pushed away from its century-old Western engagements and investments by the sheer momentum of material dynamics. Hopefully, we can navigate this wisely. Those exaggerating the situation as Türkiye turning toward the East are mistaken. That's not the case. Türkiye can neither fully align with the West nor with the East, even if it wanted to. It is a country that lies between both, embodying elements of both. Its richness lies in this unique position. What we are witnessing is simply a shift in Türkiye’s priorities and centers of influence between the West and the East.