What is the U.S. After in Syria?

Debating what the United States wants in Syria might seem futile, as the question lacks a clear answer. This is primarily because, for some time now, the U.S.’s de facto policy in Syria—shaped by what it doesn’t want—has failed to evolve into a comprehensive strategy. The result has been a patchwork approach that oscillates between non-involvement and preventing Syria from falling entirely into Iranian and Russian hands. This tactical zigzagging, spanning the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, reflects a broader U.S. foreign policy shift: prioritizing a focus on China and reducing costs in the Middle East. In Syria, this has manifested as a “policy of no policy,” swinging between violated red lines and inaction on political solutions, hindering efforts to end the civil war and bring stability to the region.

Today, the U.S. appears to have reached a point where it cannot clearly articulate what it does—or doesn’t—want in Syria.

Obama’s Reluctance

When the Arab Spring reached Syria, the Obama administration, led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, appeared to back the opposition and support regime change. However, Obama’s desire to extricate the U.S. from the Middle East and pivot to Asia, along with his prioritization of the Iran nuclear deal, prevented Syria from becoming a strategic priority. Key moments—such as shelving plans to support the Syrian opposition, rejecting the establishment of no-fly zones, reframing the conflict as a counterterrorism issue, and responding to chemical weapons use with a Russian-brokered disarmament deal—highlight Obama’s reluctance to take decisive, game-changing action in Syria.

The turning point came when Daesh seized Mosul and advanced toward Kobani. In response, Obama tasked the Pentagon with dismantling the so-called caliphate without deploying American troops, relying instead on “local partners.” This led to “temporary” and “tactical” support for the PYD starting in the fall of 2014. While this low-cost intervention evolved into what seemed like a more permanent partnership, it was clear that the relationship would eventually run its course. Congress, convinced that the anti-Daesh campaign was a success, lent full support to this tactical engagement, inadvertently giving it a veneer of strategic purpose.

### **Trump’s Convictions**

Obama’s tactical intervention, which morphed into a semi-strategic engagement, persisted under Trump. Despite famously questioning, “What are we doing in Syria?” Trump was persuaded by CENTCOM’s arguments that the U.S. had “fought shoulder to shoulder” with the YPG and couldn’t cede the field to Iran and Russia. Congress and public opinion also pressured Trump to continue supporting the Kurds, emphasizing that abandoning them would be unacceptable.

Yet, Trump saw no grand prize in Syria, further perpetuating America’s lack of strategy. The only actor capable of swaying Trump on ending YPG support was Turkish President Erdoğan. Türkiye's consistent Syria policy—focused on border security, refugee issues, military interventions, and political engagement—played a significant role in convincing Trump, who declared victory over Daesh and sought to exit. However, Washington’s broader reflex to protect Israel’s interests and maintain a foothold in the region ultimately overruled Trump’s individual inclinations.

Biden’s Apathy

The Biden administration has continued this policy vacuum, reducing Syria’s significance to two issues: the fight against Daesh and the delivery of humanitarian aid. Preoccupied with Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Gaza, Biden has shown little interest in articulating a comprehensive Middle East strategy, let alone one for Syria. As his term wanes, the administration seems focused on avoiding the “embarrassment” of a complete withdrawal of YPG terrorists, while effectively counting down the days until Trump’s potential return to power.

The U.S.’s ongoing support for a group that threatens NATO ally Türkiye’s national security exemplifies the confusion and inconsistency stemming from this policy vacuum. Justifying YPG support on emotional grounds—such as having “fought shoulder to shoulder”—rather than strategic necessity highlights the lack of a coherent vision.

What Lies Ahead

Washington’s failure to develop a comprehensive Syria policy over the years makes it unlikely to do so in the future. The U.S. will likely continue its reflexive efforts to preserve existing “gains,” but transforming this into an effective, tangible strategy will require overcoming indecision, disinterest, and reluctance. A new vision is essential if the U.S. is to clarify its objectives and craft a sustainable policy for Syria.