Is There Even a Blinken Doctrine?

When viewed through the lens of famous doctrines that have shaped U.S. foreign policy, it’s hard to argue that Secretary of State Antony Blinken has put forth a defining doctrine of his own. Serving as a loyal executor of President Biden’s foreign policy vision, Blinken has been more of a practitioner than a doctrinaire figure. Considering Biden’s extensive experience and expertise in foreign affairs throughout his political career, it’s understandable that he did not opt for a strongly doctrinaire Secretary of State.

However, Biden’s framing of global politics as a battle between “autocracies and democracies” has yet to translate into a cohesive, effective strategy. Despite Blinken’s alignment with Biden’s preferences, his tenure has not yielded a comprehensive strategy to redirect American foreign policy onto a transformative trajectory. The Biden administration, which aspired to restore U.S. leadership as the dominant actor in the international system, has struggled to deliver on this promise with a clear strategic framework.

Biden’s foreign policy began as a reaction to Trump’s “America First” approach, aiming to rebuild American credibility and alliances. Yet, crafting a broad strategic vision proved challenging. When thinking of pivotal U.S. foreign policy doctrines, names like George Kennan (containment of Soviet influence), Zbigniew Brzezinski (preventing Eurasian dominance by Russia or China), and Henry Kissinger (realpolitik and balance-of-power politics) come to mind. While Trump’s disruptive policies shook the global order, they lacked the systematic framework of doctrines like Kennan’s or Brzezinski’s. Similarly, the Biden administration’s rhetoric around countering autocracies has not evolved into a systematic doctrine.

In a recent New York Times interview, Blinken defended the administration’s foreign policy as successful—a stance unsurprising but arguably disconnected from reality. Blinken highlighted the administration’s inheritance of crises: a global pandemic, economic instability, skeptical allies, and adversaries like Russia and China perceiving the U.S. as a declining power. He claimed significant progress over four years, yet the strategic landscape suggests otherwise.

The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, though consistent with Biden’s long-standing stance, raised questions about strategic coherence. While Americans broadly supported ending “forever wars,” the resulting vacuum exposed the region to greater Chinese and Russian influence—a scenario that would have troubled strategists like Brzezinski. In Ukraine, while early support against Russian aggression and rallying Western allies was commendable, there remains no clear vision for ending the conflict.

Blinken’s framing of Israel’s actions in Gaza as primarily Hamas’s responsibility, coupled with limited humanitarian intervention, reflects the administration’s hesitance to engage with deeper solutions to the Palestinian issue. This reluctance underscores a lack of strategy in addressing long-term regional stability.

On China, Biden’s foreign policy team has promoted a competitive stance, balancing confrontation with cooperation. Measures like sanctions and export restrictions have echoed Trump-era policies, but a cohesive strategic approach to counter China’s global influence remains elusive. Blinken has not proposed bold steps to address underlying tensions, such as the Taiwan question or the broader U.S.-China rivalry.

Blinken’s defense of the administration’s record is not unexpected, but his inability to outline a strategic framework in his “exit interview” with the New York Times reveals a reluctance to confront the systemic challenges facing U.S. foreign policy. While it may be unfair to expect a new generation of strategists to replicate the intellectual legacy of Cold War figures, the need for a comprehensive doctrine in today’s multipolar world is arguably greater than ever.

By adhering to Biden’s directives without advancing a strategic perspective of his own, Blinken has missed an opportunity to shape U.S. foreign policy decisively. The absence of a "Blinken Doctrine" has contributed to ongoing uncertainties around the objectives of the Ukraine war, tacit endorsement of Israel’s actions in Gaza, stalled negotiations with Iran, and limited progress in countering China. Whether Trump’s potential second term might turn his "America First" slogan into a coherent strategy remains to be seen, but Biden’s foreign policy legacy appears mired in reactive crisis management and conventional American reflexes.