Netanyahu is afraid of Türkiye

One of the most striking news stories in recent days is this: "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent his military secretary, R. Gofman, to Moscow. Tel Aviv wants Moscow to maintain its military presence in Syria."

This report, which surfaced in the Israeli media, has an interesting background. Fear of Türkiye is growing by the day in Tel Aviv. It seems that Israel has not received the response it wanted from Türkiye regarding Syria. What is the current situation? Let’s explain.

Israel’s core strategy in Syria has always been to keep the country weak and fragmented. Assad served this purpose well. He was at odds with his own people. The country was on the brink of division. For Israel, the presence of Assad and Iran in Syria was the ideal scenario.

We also know that Israel had an agreement with Russia at that time. Syria's airspace was controlled by both Russia and the US. Under a 2019 agreement with Russia, Israel was able to conduct airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria at will. The Russians were informed before each attack, ensuring military coordination.

But the situation in Syria has now changed dramatically for Israel. Assad was overthrown by the opposition. Syrian President Sharaa is pursuing a rational and pragmatic policy, embracing all factions, working to preserve the country’s territorial integrity, and sending the right signals to international actors to lift sanctions on Syria. He has made progress in this regard. The Gulf states have shown great interest in Damascus. The EU has suspended sanctions in sectors like banking, energy, and transportation.

The Syrian government is also in talks with Russia to normalize the country (with Ankara playing a facilitating role). On February 12, Russian President Putin called Sharaa. During this conversation, the Russian side reaffirmed its commitment to helping improve Syria's socio-economic conditions. Recently, while Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was in Ankara, reports emerged that Syrian Foreign Minister Shaybani had secretly traveled to Ankara to meet with Lavrov.

For Russia, the future of its naval bases in Syria is a key issue. After December 8, a Russian official stated, "We want to talk to the Syrians; this is their decision to make." It is said that Syria is not opposed to a limited Russian military presence, provided it is strictly regulated and does not compromise the country’s sovereignty.

Israel is taking steps to reverse this new reality in Syria. It has expanded its occupation of the Golan Heights. It has targeted all of Syria’s military infrastructure. It is lobbying the US to ensure that sanctions on Syria are not lifted. It is telling the SDG/PKK terrorist group to “lay down arms” to further the country’s division.

At the same time, it is provoking the Druze community. Netanyahu’s statement that “we will not allow the extremist Islamist regime in Syria to harm the Druze” and his directive to prepare the army is a dangerous move. In response, Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s warning—“Syrians must be wary of Israel’s plans. Israel is spreading chaos. I will go to Syria and meet with Sharaa”—is reassuring. Despite Israeli threats, security forces loyal to Damascus have been deployed in some Druze-majority areas as part of an agreement with the Druze. This is significant.

Beyond all this, Israel’s ultimate goal is a coup in Damascus. I am not saying they will succeed, but they will certainly try. Keen observers can see it: Israel’s propaganda machine is using every tool at its disposal to demonize the Sharaa administration and associate it with terrorism.

Now, let’s return to the development mentioned at the beginning. What is Israel looking for in Moscow? According to Israeli media, Tel Aviv prefers to engage with Russia over Türkiye, which is the dominant power in the region (the fact that this visit coincided with ongoing Moscow-Damascus talks is also noteworthy). They are concerned about three issues: first, Türkiye’s growing military ties with Syria; second, the training of the Syrian army and the advanced technological capabilities being provided to it; and third, control over Syrian airspace.

Let’s add a few more reasons. One: Israel cannot do to Türkiye what it does to Iran—it cannot demonize Türkiye. Türkiye acts in accordance with international law. Two: Türkiye is a major economic and military power. Its army is a deterrent force, one of the rare militaries that has successfully integrated high technology with battlefield experience. Three: Trump, whom Israel trusts, respects Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Four: Syria’s stability—due to threats like terrorism and migration that directly impact Türkiye—is a matter of national security. Ankara will not back down in Syria. Five: Because of the fourth point, Israel fears a direct confrontation with Türkiye (as noted in the Nagel Committee report). Some even see this as inevitable.

This issue is far from settled. But let me emphasize one thing: I had heard that Tel Aviv was looking for a similar arrangement with Russia as before. It seems they also had certain expectations from Türkiye. But they didn’t get the green light. That might be why they ended up in Moscow.