On Kursk…

The Russia-Ukraine war will be remembered in the future as a hybrid conflict that shows how the nature of war has transformed. Some authorities refer to it as the Fourth Generation War. It’s truly unusual. This is a shadowy war where the real sides are both present and absent. Those who look deeper suggest that this conflict is actually a manifestation of the US-China struggle for global dominance. One of these actors, the US, is partially visible on the ground through its financial and military support for Ukraine. China’s role, however, is uncertain. Meanwhile, countless children of the same nation are killing each other.

Recently, some striking events have occurred. Russia, which has attacked and captured a significant portion of Ukraine and continued advancing within Ukrainian territory, seemed poised for victory. Just when it appeared the war was concluding, the Ukrainian army entered Russian territory and initiated a counter-invasion in the Kursk region. This situation upends the attacker-defender dynamic. The defender becomes the attacker, and the attacker becomes the defender. This can be seen as a characteristic twist of the postmodern world. However, the situation is not that simple.

I remember during the early stages of the war, one of the regular TV commentators confidently predicted, "This will be over in a week." This oversimplification was due to their lack of understanding of historical structural crises. Their mind was likely still in the context of the 1968 Prague Spring or the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, mistakenly believing that the Cold War was ongoing. They overlooked Vietnam and Afghanistan. Indeed, the Cold War's logic had already been upended by the Vietnam War and many subsequent asymmetric conflicts. War was no longer a matter of the strong absolutely winning and the weak absolutely losing. Ammunition, equipment, and firepower were no longer guarantees of victory.

Traditional armies are suited to industrial societies. The structure of an army is similar to that of a state office or a factory, with functional differences being minimal. Both their structure and their command and control are heavy and cumbersome. In modern wars, heavy-structured armies would face off against each other, with victory often determined by the weight difference between the sides. Of course, the influence of skilled generals like Wellington, Napoleon, or Kutuzov, who could change the fate of battles, cannot be ignored. However, their prowess still manifested in the heavy decisions made within heavy structures. General Giap, who is less remembered today, was not a Kutuzov. He fought against the formidable US army with much less firepower in the hellish jungles of Vietnam. He was not a military academy graduate but a history teacher. Yet, he inflicted severe losses on the US army, which used the most advanced weapons of the time. His tactics were to avoid direct confrontation, hide, set traps, and strike at unexpected times. The Vietnam War was a clear example of how the smaller can overcome the larger, and the weak can defeat the strong, reflecting the logic of Asian martial arts that focus on how to overcome stronger opponents with wisdom. Gandhi provided the most spiritual example through nonviolence, while Giap provided the most material example.

The Soviet bureaucracy, which supported the Viet Cong, failed to learn from this, and in 1979, made the mistake of invading Afghanistan. The US bureaucracy, which supported Afghan guerrillas and experienced the Soviets' defeat, repeated the error in 2001, and could not avoid a similar fate in 2021.

One might say, "They were defeated in Afghanistan but won in Iraq." Yes, but Iraq did not resist due to its internal structure. If it had, Iraq could easily have become a new Afghanistan for the US and the UK.

All these experiences seem to have enlightened both Russia and the US. It has become clear that it is no longer possible for those enormous armies to invade and hold any territory. The era of occupations has ended. Now, you must be content with inflicting significant damage from a distance with planes and missiles. This only serves to sharpen the defensive side against you. They are no longer interested in fighting but in making others fight. The outcome is now determined by who can force whom into direct confrontation. This shift has given the world and military history a new gift: the rise of mercenaries and proxy wars, replacing the Napoleonic army structures and battles. (Machiavelli, who harshly criticized feudal mercenaries, would likely be turning in his grave). On the day Putin started the Ukraine war, his announcement to the Russian people, with a thoughtful and somber expression, that the war would be long seemed tragic. We witnessed the Russian army initially struggling on the northern front, changing tactics, and launching a new campaign from the east. There were numerous dramatic mistakes, Prigozhin and Wagner incidents, and other purges. Yes, the war is still largely conventional. Let’s assume Russia won and overthrew the alleged neo-Nazi regime and took control of Ukraine. Even if the West withdrew and did not escalate the situation, would that be the end? There is no doubt that Ukraine will become a new Afghanistan.

Industrial capitalism, having succumbed to its deep contradictions, is collapsing along with all its supporting structures. The disappearance of the working class and the shrinking middle class have left no economy, bureaucracy, or army behind. This collapse manifests as a chaotic degeneration reminiscent of the feudal world we thought we had long surpassed. It feels as though we are experiencing the return of what was suppressed. The contradictions of capitalism are now giving rise to a new synthesis that is not progressive but regressive. Expecting a third world war similar to World War II is futile. We are witnessing an anomic historical understanding where everyone is pitted against each other domestically, and proxy forces clash externally.