The political earthquake between Saudi Arabia and Iran has overshadowed the news, in early January, about the possibility of a diplomatic reconciliation between Turkey and Israel. This news included the possibility of Israel exporting natural gas to Turkey. It is instructive to link together the Turkey-Israel and the Saudi-Iran questions. It should be noted, first of all, that there have been rumors before about a Turkish-Israeli reconciliation and those did not come to pass. It was the liberal Israeli newspaper Haaretz that "leaked" this story, perhaps to apply political pressure inside Israel for approval of the deal. But even so, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey has said that he has not seen its specific provisions.
Although this Turkish-Israeli rapprochement has been in the works for some time (indeed, previous attempts to restore diplomatic relations have failed), in the context of the recent Turkish-Russian rift, the initiative may be seen from Turkey's side as an attempt to move Israel away from Russia. From that standpoint, it is unlikely to work. Israel needs aerial coordination with Russia over Syrian airspace, arrangements for this have been made, and they have been working.
Also, Israel will never agree to unrestricted resupply of Gaza. Although creative diplomacy may arrange for verification of shipments, for example, via Cyprus where they could be inspected, the economics suggest that Turkey needs Israel more than Israel needs Turkey.
It is true, that Israel wants markets for its gas and that Turkey wants to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. However, it would be difficult for Israel to rely on Turkey for transit of gas to Europe in light of recent bilateral relations. The proposed Eastern Mediterranean ("East Med") pipeline from Israel through Cyprus, which has also its own gas for export, to Greece makes Turkey unnecessary as a transit country.
How does this affect the Saudi-Iranian equation? Israel has greatly improved its intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, which has in turn established strong relations with the new Egyptian regime. Yet it is an open secret that the Muslim Brotherhood operates easily in Turkey in order to oppose and attack Cairo, including underground and military operations on Egyptian soil.
Israeli-Egyptian cooperation in the Sinai has also greatly improved. So from this standpoint, Israel has little motive potentially to displease these two states, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with which it has strong common interests, by reestablishing relations with Turkey, which militantly opposes both regimes in power.
Turkey may wish to play peace broker between the Saudi Arabia and Iran, but Russia has already offered itself for this role. It is natural if Iran were forced to choose, that it would prefer Russia; and if Saudi Arabia were forced to choose, then it would prefer Turkey. Yet there is little prospect of Turkey and Russia cooperating in this direction. The balance is not simple. Turkey is an important player in the region, which neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran would wish to alienate.
Turkey must be careful not to appear weak in relation to the situation in Syria, or else it would lose diplomatic ground there to either Saudi Arabia or Iran, or also Russia, which is heavily implicated.
Yet while Turkey is an important player in the region, that neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can risk alienating, still the close relations between Russia and Iran may lead Turkey to tilt in favor of Saudi Arabia. Also, Turkey has economic relations with both countries, but those with Saudi Arabia have a better horizon for more significant development. It is a cruel puzzle, that what is required to guarantee peace is economic cooperation and prosperity, but only peace can bring economic cooperation and prosperity. The development of markets and human resources does not take place in the short term, though. Turkey risks being overwhelmed by the war and instability in its neighborhood. It does not have the diplomatic, economic, or human resources to impose peace.
Israel might sell gas to Turkey, but would be unlikely to rely on Turkey for gas transit to Europe. Turkey's "ship of state" is being tossed on the seas of social, political, and religious upheaval. This is why Turkey reaches out to Israel as a buoy of stability.
Israel could indeed be such a point of reference for all these countries. It is so for Egypt, and increasingly so for Saudi Arabia. Iran's state ideology and its consistent wish to revise the map of region against the interests of its neighbors are the greatest stumbling-block to peace and stability.
By Robert M. Cutler
