The volatile climate that marked US foreign policy in the Donald Trump era not only harmed EU-Turkey relations, but also adversely affected US relations with the European Union. There is no question that this is not the first crisis in the transatlantic relations. For instance, the Bush administration’s unilateral policies widened the gap between Washington and Brussels in 2003, as Europe and the USA, two transatlantic partners, “lost each other somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad,” as Robert Kagan put it. Around the same time, we have started to hear about what began to be referred to as “two Wests”. According to this narrative, the political unity of the West in global politics had been disrupted by the US, and Europe had begun to build its own global role, willingly or not. But it was not Trump’s actions and rhetoric that exacerbated the crisis between the EU and the US, or caused the rise of the term “two Wests” in the first place.
This divergence is quite interesting indeed, because when Trump first came to power in the US and provided the first foreign policy examples of Trumpism, the Europeans were busy announcing the “global strategy” of the EU, that is, they were busy peddling the claim that Europe was a global actor. Moreover, in the light of its own experiences, the EU, in its relations with Washington, wanted to hold onto its autonomy --strategic autonomy, to be precise-- when its interests were at stake. In spite of all this, the EU had a hard time developing a Western alternative thought or ground for action against Trump’s America.
Primarily, we should accept that the policies implemented by the Trump administration against Brussels restricted the EU’s ability to act autonomously, both militarily and politically. For example, the mechanisms put in place by the EU -- despite US opposition -- to bypass sanctions against Iran (including the INSTEX) and to preserve the 2015 Nuclear Deal failed. As a matter of fact, Brussels was able to use the INSTEX, implemented to bypass the sanctions imposed by Washington and in order to continue its trade with Iran, only once, and that was to transport medicine to Tehran. Second, Britain’s withdrawal from the EU (Brexit), both in military and political terms, left Brussels high and dry at a time of hard and soft security issues that had already proven to be very challenging. Third, the EU had a truly hard time getting the 27 member states together on the same foreign policy and security agenda, not merely in words but in essence. As the EU bureaucracy narrowed the scope of negotiations over EU criteria, significant gaps and differences of opinion arose among the 27 member states. In recent years, therefore, the EU has failed to develop a robust policy in the field of common security and foreign policy, sufficiently robust to resolve the outstanding issues. The EU has failed to assert itself as an effective player capable of weighing in on the Iran nuclear crisis, the Eastern Mediterranean crisis, the Karabakh issue, or the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
In short, since the Maastricht Agreement, Brussels has tried to develop a shared foreign policy, but, instead, has kept staggering despite all the institutional decisions taken, and has failed to live up to its claims of strategic autonomy, that is, to its foreign policy line that was supposed to be independent of the US. Consequently, the prevailing mood in Brussels reflects a desire for a more sensible administration in the US that will not ignore the wishes of the EU. That is why Joe Biden’s win in the US Presidential election of Nov. 3, 2020 was seen as a major opportunity for the EU. However, it is not known how much one can rely on the US pledge to reclaim global leadership, as the Capitol Hill raid on Jan. 6 laid bare the problems of the Biden administration and the deep polarization of the US. As a result, Brussels, which has long failed to achieve unity and harmony in EU foreign policy but does not want to place all its eggs in the US basket, needs backup plans. At this point, the potential benefits of normalization with Turkey have already begun to be discussed.
- Is it possible to turn over a new leaf for the Turkey-EU relations?
Despite the ups and downs, Turkey-EU relations have tended to be on a trajectory of slow progress. In recent years, however, certain EU member states have been trying to take EU-Turkey relations hostage. The Greek Cypriot and Greek black propaganda against Turkey are actually aiming to open up more space for the maximalist demands of South Nicosia and Athens in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, using their anti-Turkey policy as a pretext. France and Austria have sometimes supported this propaganda for populist reasons. However, efforts to turn the maximalist claims of Athens and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCA) into a Union policy by accusing Ankara of pursuing an aggressive policy have not been successful, as demonstrated by recent EU summits and meetings. At this point, we can state that the Union has come up with an ambiguous formula. On the one hand, during the period from the EU Med Summit (Med 7) to the Euro Summit on Dec. 10-11, countries such as Hungary, Spain, Italy, Malta, and most importantly Germany, as the Term President of the European Council, which view the legitimate rights of Turkey, and by extension, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the Mediterranean more positively, showed on different occasions that they would not allow the EU to impose sanctions on Turkey. But on the other hand, the EU adopted a policy of postponement by refraining from taking the ultimate step that would turn over a new leaf on relations between Brussels and Ankara by failing to prevent actors such as Greece and the GCA from bringing up Turkey’s legitimate rights as a problem. Indeed, it was stated at the EU Leaders’ Summit in December that the possible implementation of sanctions against Turkey would be discussed again at the European Summit on March 25-26, 2021.
It should be noted that the initiative to break this vicious circle came from Turkey. EU officials, who actually had positive expectations of transatlantic relations but were quick to realize the possible uncertainties awaiting the US after the storming of the US Congress on Jan. 6, seem to have taken the opportunity to respond to Ankara’s constructive diplomatic appeals. At any rate, the change in the discourse of many EU member states towards Turkey indicates that the diplomatic channel opened by Ankara could actually help to restore the EU-Turkey relations. The latest letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in which Macron proposes the development of bilateral relations, heralds a positive change.
These positive signs from the EU are not only related to the uncertain political environment in the US and Turkey’s reopening of the doors of diplomacy; they have another reason. Policies centered on antagonism against Ankara have availed the actors pursuing these policies nothing. In fact, the risk of further radicalization of the current atmosphere has further reduced Macron’s chances of receiving political recognition from the French people who are struggling with economic and pandemic-related problems. Meanwhile, Ankara’s disregard of Greece’s recent provocations and prioritization of multifaceted diplomacy moves in a way that would not injure its rights in the Aegean and the Mediterranean have dashed the hopes of Ankara’s opponents in the EU. What lies behind the recent warm messages from the EU to Turkey, as our President Erdogan stated, is “Ankara’s strong will and determination that it has demonstrated to the whole world in critical issues such as the Eastern Mediterranean and Karabakh.” Briefly, the most substantial factor pushing the EU to re-engage in dialogue with Turkey is the policy of establishing a balance between the negotiation table and the actions on the ground, implemented by Ankara with great determination.
It is very significant that Germany, cognizant of the changing atmosphere, has taken a pioneering step within the EU by sending German Foreign Minister Maas to Ankara to respond to its repeated calls on EU members, and even Greece, for using the diplomatic channels. Although this step is not enough to turn over a new leaf, it still counts as support extended by Germany in recognition of the belief that “there can be no Europe without Turkey, and no Turkey without Europe,” as President Erdogan has said on various occasions. Likewise, prior to Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s visit to Brussels on Jan. 21, EU High Representative Josep Borrell said that the EU-Turkey relations were better compared to last summer. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen is expected to visit Turkey at the end of January and exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey resumed on Jan. 25, which show that the diplomatic channel between Ankara and Brussels has regained dynamism.
Notwithstanding this diplomacy traffic, Ankara’s expectations for the beginning of a new era in Turkey-EU relations are unequivocally clear: reforming and renegotiating the Customs Union, the granting of visa liberalization, the fulfillment of the requirements of the refugee agreement, and giving due consideration to Ankara’s proposal to convene an inclusive conference to discuss Eastern Mediterranean issues.
- EU needs a success story
At this stage, no one expects that these deep-rooted issues between the two sides will be resolved overnight. In spite of this, we hope that the EU has finally grasped the fact that Turkey is indispensable to European security. Moreover, the fact that EU members, which cannot form a common foreign policy among themselves, have not, for the time being, greenlighted the anti-Turkey policies of Greece and its supporters gives us hope and optimism in regard to Ankara’s initiative to establish a new channel for dialogue with Brussels. There is, of course, a group of countries in the EU, first and foremost Greece, that want to sabotage this channel. Indeed, it is already clear that Athens wants to push the limits of Turkey’s patience over the contents of the exploratory talks. However, Ankara, which now has a very strong foothold on the ground, has already taken action to establish a new dialogue with the EU on the basis of the principle of equal sovereignty. We hope that Brussels, whose dreams of strategic autonomy have been perpetually postponed, will seize this opportunity and that a process will begin which can produce effective and positive results at the level of regional policies. With uncertainty in the US continuing, the EU, more than Turkey, needs to assert its presence through a success story.
