An interesting study that I recently conducted, which was completed in mid-December 2016, with funding from Kadir Has University has revealed much about how Turkish elites view Turkish foreign policy and Greek-Turkish relations. It was inspired by an earlier study/survey, whose results were published in November 2014, that I had conducted together with a Greek colleague for the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics on the perceptions of Greek elites about Turkey's foreign policy and Greek-Turkish relations. Those surveyed were representative elites from the fields of business, journalism, diplomacy, the military, politics and academia.
The focus on elites rather than the average public reflects the argument that competition among elite groups not only shapes public opinion, but also helps formulate policy. In the case of Greece and Turkey, the opinions of elites reflect to a great extent public opinion of the “other" given the continued inability to reach some sort of long-term accord on issues that divide the two countries, despite the start of a rapprochement process in 1999. Here are some of the key findings that reflect the mindset of elites in both countries. The first is that there is strong support for the rapprochement process on both sides with 89 percent of the Turkish elites surveyed in favor of it in contrast to 63.5 percent of their Greek counterparts.
On the other hand, the level of trust toward the “other" is especially low, at 28 percent by Turkish elites and 11.4 percent by Greek elites. This lack of trust obviously affects key aspects of the bilateral relationship. From a Turkish perspective, there seems to be an almost direct correlation between the perceived role and importance of Greece in the European Union and its lack of alternatives and Turkey's need for a greater international role (71.5 percent) and its distancing from the West (79.1 percent). While 47.7 percent of Turkish respondents consider Greece to be an important EU member state, 66.3 percent think that Greece can influence international politics because it is a member of the EU and NATO, 84% percent think that Greece has no alternative to being a member of the EU. In fact, 50.6 percent of Turkish elites surveyed consider Greece's EU membership to be a threat to Turkey. This is only reflected in the fact that only 25 percent think that Greece is steadily supporting Turkey's accession to the EU, as opposed to the 51.6 percent of Greek elites in the study who believe that Greece should continue steadily supporting Turkey's EU accession process.
Furthermore, both Turkish and Greek elites stressed the overwhelming importance of the Cyprus issue for the resolution of bilateral issues – at 95.9 percent for Turkish elites and 92.4 percent for Greek elites. Yet, while 52.3 percent of Turkish elites perceive Turkey to be a constructive player in the resolution of the Cyprus issue, 72.9 percent believe that Greece is not.
As a consequence of this lack of trust, 41.9 percent of Turkish elites and 47 percent of Greek elites consider Greek-Turkish relations to be neither good nor bad. In addition, 53.5 percent of Turkish elites and 47 percent of their Greek counterparts consider any crisis between the two countries within the next five years to be improbable or rather improbable.
What does a quick read of the aforementioned results suggest? They encapsulate what I would call a “cold peace" between the two countries, and not a rapprochement, the process of which has never been properly formalized beyond high-level, bilateral, political contacts and a stated desire for bilateral trade and tourism to grow. They suggest a cold peace where there is both an unwillingness and/or an inability to resolve outstanding disputes and move toward signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation, as France and West Germany did in 1963. This acceptance of the continuance of the status quo has its risks as, for example, the longer relations between the EU and Turkey remain frayed, the Greek strategy of supporting Turkey's EU bid becomes less effective and actually complicates bilateral relations. The status quo also reflects the growing disconnect between elites and parts of their societies.
This is particularly evident in the Cyprus context, which both sides see as an impetus for the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations (a case of passing the buck, maybe?). In Cyprus, part of the reason that talks have progressed so much over the last few months has to do with a growing and vocal segment of Cypriot civil society – both Greek and Turkish –dissatisfied with the status quo. Whether Athens and Ankara understand this and are eventually able to fundamentally contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue and dare place bilateral relations on a solid foundation that would not be shaken by hearsay, negative discourse and lack of trust, remains to be seen. The perceptions of elites suggest that is imperative, as the maintenance of the status quo holds far too many risks.
